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The impact of time limitation: Insights from a queueing experiment
Anna Conte∗ Marco Scarsini† Oktay Sürücü‡
Abstract
We experimentally explore the effects of time limitation on decision making. Under different time allowance conditions,
subjects are presented with a queueing situation and asked to join one of the two given queues. The results can be grouped
under two main categories. The first one concerns the factors driving decisions in a queueing system. Only some subjects
behave consistently with rationality principles and use the relevant information efficiently. The rest of the subjects seem to
adopt a simpler strategy that does not incorporate some information into their decision. The second category is related to the
effects of time limitation on decision performance. A substantial proportion of the population is not affected by time limitations
and shows consistent behavior throughout the treatments. On the other hand, some subjects’ performance is impaired by time
limitations. More importantly, this impairment is not due to the stringency of the limitation but rather to being exposed to a
time constraint.
Keywords: time pressure, decision times, join the shortest queue, experimentation
1 Introduction
In today’s fast paced world, many economic situations re-
quire quick and efficient judgments and decisions. Traders
on financial markets, for example, feel the time pressure
severely since the speed of their reaction to new information
is of great importance. Some other actors who are exposed
to time pressure are negotiators, last-minute bidders, man-
agers, and even customers in a retail store, since they have
to rapidly decide to which cashier counter queue to join in
order to avoid negative externalities from potential newcom-
ers.
When decision makers have less time than needed (or per-
ceived as needed), they may feel stressed (Hammond, 2000;
Svenson & Maule, 1993). This stress, in turn, may affect
performance. Individuals may also differ in their reactions
to the stress caused by time limitation (Payne, Bettman, &
Johnson, 1988; Svenson &Maule, 1993; Verplanken, 1993).
Some may perform worse than they would under no time
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pressure while others may do better thanks to the stress-
induced stimulation (Rastegary & Landy, 1993). The pri-
mary goal of this paper is to experimentally explore the ef-
fects of time limitation on decision performance and inves-
tigate possible heterogeneity in coping with time limitation.
In our experimental setting, we consider a queueing sit-
uation. Queues are formed, and customers have to wait,
whenever the capacity of a service provider fails to meet
the instantaneous demand. In everyday life we encounters
queues when buying museum or concert tickets, conduct-
ing a transaction in a bank, calling a hotline, entering in a
popular restaurant or club, etc.
Waiting in a queue is irritating, frustrating and, hence,
costly. Therefore, a customer may decide to balk at the
prospect of waiting or to abandon the queue after joining
and waiting for a while. Moreover, customers may even be
willing to pay extra in order to decrease or eliminate waiting
times. Visitors of a Six Flags amusement park, for example,
can buy one of three types of pass (Regular, Gold and Plat-
inum), in order to eliminate physical wait in queues and re-
duce the actual waiting time. A driver without any passenger
can pay a fee and use high occupancy vehicle (HOV) lanes
that are originally designed for carpools of two or more.
What determines customer behavior is the comparison
between the expected benefit of getting the service and the
expected cost of waiting. Under the assumption of full ra-
tionality, this comparison is made by extracting information
about the length, velocity and the entry fee of a queue. How-
ever, it is questionable whether people behave rationally
and use the information they could extract when making a
queueing decision. The secondary goal of the present study
is to shed light on this issue by analyzing the characteristics
of queues to which people pay attention when making such
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a decision. More specifically, we aim at answering the ques-
tion of whether customers accurately calculate the costs and
benefits of joining a queue and make their decision accord-
ingly. If this is not the case, what is the behavioral pattern
followed? Which aspects of queues play important roles and
affect decisions?
Our choice of the experimental setting, a queueing situ-
ation, makes it easier for subjects to understand the exper-
iment since it is a familiar set-up they encounter in daily
life repeatedly. Furthermore, the queueing decision task re-
quires no strategic thinking. It is a binary choice where one
alternative is often better than the other. However, it re-
quires cognitive abilities to correctly evaluate the two given
alternatives. The non-strategic feature of the queueing task
sets the stage for analyzing the impact of time limitation on
the basics of a decision making process. More importantly,
understanding how customers behave in a queueing system
helps to determine how to operate a system in the most ef-
ficient way. According to Hillier and Lieberman (2001), 37
billion hours per year are spent waiting in queues in the US,
which would amount to 20 million person-years of useful
work per year, if it were spent productively. It is thus im-
portant to design queueing systems based on customers’ be-
havior.
In this article, we experimentally study and analyze cus-
tomers’ behavior within a simplistic queueing system. In a
computerized laboratory setting, we ask subjects to choose
between two given queues, each of which is connected to
a different server. The servers provide the same service
but they differ in speed, length and entry fee, which is the
amount one has to pay in order to join that queue. There
are 40 variants of the queueing task, and to examine the im-
pact of time limitation on customers’ choice each variant is
repeated three times under different treatment conditions of
time allowance: 5 seconds (5 sec), 10 seconds (10 sec) and
no time limitation (NTL). The within-subject design allows
us to investigate how individuals respond to changes in the
level of time limitation.
We analyze the data by means of a finite mixture model.
The mixture approach enables us to identify whether there
are subjects in our sample who use all the provided informa-
tion efficiently, that is, perform consistently with the princi-
ples of rationality, and subjects who use alternative decision
criteria, and, in this case, which ones.
Our experimental analysis suggests that only a proportion
of the population seems to make choices exploiting infor-
mation at best and acts as “profit maximizers”. The size of
this group decreases as time limitation becomes stringent.
The remainder of the population appears to consider only
a part of the provided information when making their de-
cisions concerning the queue to join. These subjects, who
ponder information in a less-than-efficient way, are referred
to as "naïve". What is interesting here is that, even though
it is explicitly given, naïve subjects seem not to incorporate
the information about the average waiting times into their
decisions, and tend to join the shorter queue. The existence
of this type of behavior is also supported by a field exper-
iment conducted by Lu, Musalem, Olivares, and Schilkrut
(2013) at a grocery store deli counter.
From the analysis of the actual decision times, we find
that the decision time significantly changes across treat-
ments, and in particular it increases as time limitation is
relaxed. Moreover, maximizers take more time than than
naïve subjects in any treatment. Another interesting result
we obtain is that, when we introduce time limitations, de-
cision performance worsens significantly even if the time
allowance is more than what is used under the no time limi-
tation treatment. This observation supports the idea that it is
the existence of a limitation but not the insufficiency of the
time allowance that harms the performance.
Our results mirror somewhat those obtained by
Rubinstein (2007) in game situations. Rubinstein in-
vited the audience in some of his lectures to participate
in web-based experiments (e.g., beauty contest, ultimatum
game, centipede game, and so on), recording their response
time. From the collected data, he infers that the choices that
require cognitive reasoning require more time than those
made instinctively. However, Rubinstein admits some po-
tential criticism to his approach, and in particular he points
out the effect of individual heterogeneity. The present
study overcomes this by collecting several observations per
subject and by means of a panel estimation approach which
controls for individual-specific effects.
Another study that provides similar results to ours is
Conte, Hey, and Soraperra (2014). It examines decision
times in the context of an experimental investigation of mul-
tiple prior models of behavior under ambiguity, distinguish-
ing among four different types of decision maker. The anal-
ysis reveals that the easier the preference functional subjects
seem to apply, the less time they take to make a decision be-
tween ambiguous lotteries.
The characterization of customer behavior analyzed in
this article provides useful inputs and suggestions for re-
searchers as well as practitioners. The different effects of
time limitation on individuals raise the question of whether
it is possible to design a mechanism that screens and dis-
criminates customers. The effects of this type of discrimi-
nation on the profit of a principal and on welfare could be
further investigated. Moreover, our findings potentially pave
the way for further research on queueing behavior in more
complicated settings.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a
historical overview and discusses the research papers that
we think are most closely related to the present study. The
experimental design and procedures are discussed in Sec-
tion 3. Section 4 outlines the characteristics of the sam-
ple, describes the econometric model of the choice data and
presents our results. Section 5 concludes with a discussion.
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2 Literature review
Psychological literature has long investigated the impacts of
time pressure (Svenson & Maule, 1993; Hammond, 2000;
Ariely & Zakay, 2001), coming to the conclusion that indi-
viduals cope with stress due to time pressure mainly in the
following three ways: (i) Acceleration, processing informa-
tion at a faster pace (Ben Zur & Breznitz, 1981; Payne et
al., 1988); (ii) Filtration, neglecting some information and
processing only a subset of information that is perceived as
most important (Wright, 1974; Ben Zur & Breznitz, 1981;
Böckenholt & Kroeger, 1993; Rieskamp &Hoffrage, 2008);
and (iii) Adaptation of different strategies or decision rules,
switching to a simpler strategy, as from an alternative-based
to a less cognitively demanding attribute-based processing
strategy (Zakay, 1985; Payne et al., 1988; Svenson, Ed-
land, & Slovic, 1990; Payne, Bettman, & Johnson, 1993).
Ben Zur and Breznitz (1981) argue that people may view
combining acceleration and filtration as the optimal strategy
when under time pressure. Furthermore, Payne et al. (1988)
maintain that there might be a hierarchy of responses to time
pressure. First, people may engage in acceleration and try
to respond by working faster. If the pressure is too high and
acceleration does not suffice, they may next filter available
information and consider only a subset of it. If this is still
insufficient, they may change strategy and opt for a simpler
one.
Empirical evidence has indicated that there might be in-
dividual differences in how people adapt to time pressure
(Kaplan, Wanshula, & Zanna, 1993; Rastegary & Landy,
1993; Stiensmeier-Pelster & Schürmann, 1993; Verplanken,
1993). The experimental results presented by Stiensmeier-
Pelster and Schürmann (1993) support the idea that some
people respond to time pressure by filtrating information,
whereas others by accelerating the process.
In economic literature, however, the impact of time pres-
sure on decision making has received little attention. Its ef-
fect on risk attitude is investigated by a few studies, and con-
tradictory results have been reported. While Young, Goodie,
Hall, and Wu (2012) show that time pressure increases risk-
seeking behavior in the gain domain, Kocher, Pahlke, and
Trautmann (2013) find no time pressure effect on risk atti-
tudes for gains, but an increase in risk aversion for losses.
Furthermore, a few studies demonstrate the negative impact
of time pressure in strategic interactions. De Dreu (2003)
finds evidence that perceived time pressure reduces effi-
ciency in negotiation by weakening people’s motivation to
process information. Sutter, Kocher, and Strauß (2003) con-
sider bargaining behavior in an ultimatum game under time
pressure and conclude that time pressure has high efficiency
costs since it leads to significantly high rejection rates of of-
fers. Kocher and Sutter (2006) show that in an experimental
beauty-contest game, the rate of convergence to equilibrium
and payoffs are lower under high time pressure than under
low time pressure. Finally, in learning based tasks, empiri-
cal evidence indicates that subjects under time pressure per-
form worse than without such constraints (Cella, Dymond,
Cooper, & Turnbull, 2007; DeDonno & Demaree, 2008).
Another strand of related literature concerns Queueing
Theory. The birth of Queuing Theory dates back to 1909,
when Agner Krarup Erlang (1878–1929) published his pio-
neering work on telephone traffic. Since then, his contribu-
tions have been widely applied in many different fields. In
economics, the first main contribution is due to Naor (1969).
In the simplest queueing model, customers arrive at a server
according to a Poisson process with rate λ and are served
by a server with rate µ. When a customer arrives, if the
server is idle, then the service starts immediately, otherwise
the customer stays in a queue until all the customers who ar-
rived before her have been served. This model is expressed
as M/M/1, to indicate that both arrival and service times
are Markovian and there is only one server. When λ ≥ µ,
the system explodes in the long run, that is, queues tend to
grow unboundedly. In a slightly more complicatedM/M/c
model, there are c servers. The arrival and service times are
Markovian, as before. When a customer arrives, if she finds
an available server, she starts being served immediately, oth-
erwise she stays in a queue. As soon as one of the servers be-
comes idle, the customer who has been in the queue longer
starts being served. More complicated models can be stud-
ied by changing the stochastic assumptions about arrival and
service times or by assuming that customers may have to go
through more than one server, which happens, for instance,
in an amusement park. In the above models, customers have
no active role and make no strategic decisions.
More recently, strategic models for queues have been con-
sidered. In these models, customers can make decisions like
joining a queue or balking, staying in a queue or reneging,
choosing one server or another. These decisions can hap-
pen under different informational conditions. For instance,
customers may observe the length of the queues, as for in-
stance in a supermarket, or they may be informed about the
expected waiting time, as in some call centers, or they may
know nothing at all, etc. When customers make decisions
in queues, they need to take into consideration the behavior
of the other customers, since each customer’s waiting time
depends on everybody’s decision. This explains why game-
theoretic concepts of equilibrium are used in these models.
We refer the reader, for instance, to Gross (2008) for classi-
cal non-strategic queueing models and to Hassin and Haviv
(2003); Hassin (2016) for strategic models.
The few experimental studies on Queueing Theory can
be divided into three groups. The first group includes ex-
periments in which the assumption of exogenous arrival
times is relaxed. The key finding for customer behav-
ior in such a set-up, where agents decide on their arrival
times in case they want to join a (unobservable) queue, is
that there is a strong support for mixed-strategy equilibrium
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play only at the aggregate but not at the individual level
(Rapoport, Stein, Parco, & Seale, 2004; Seale, Parco, Stein,
& Rapoport, 2005; Stein, Rapoport, Seale, Zhang, & Zwick,
2007; Daniel, Gisches, & Rapoport, 2009; Rapoport, Stein,
Mak, Zwick, & Seale, 2010). The second group consists
of experiments in which the quality of the service is not
perfectly known. Strong evidence shows that waiting time
and length of a queue are positive predictors of quality per-
ception, satisfaction and purchase intentions when quality
is uncertain (Koo & Fishbach, 2010; Giebelhausen, Robin-
son, & Cronin, 2011; Kremer & Debo, 2013). Experiments
that question the psychological impact of waiting in a queue
fall into the third group. Some of the key findings in this
group are that the way time is treated depends on the con-
text, agents are risk-averse in the domain of losses (Leclerc,
Schmitt, & Dube, 1995), congestion aversion is more dom-
inant than risk aversion (Kumar & Krishnamurthy, 2008),
and there is a decrease in inequality aversion and an increase
in negative reciprocity after being exposed to unoccupied
waiting time (Oxoby & Bischak, 2005).
Our paper differs from the above-mentioned studies on
time pressure in that we do not consider risk attitude, learn-
ing or strategic decisions. In order to investigate the pure im-
pact of pressure induced by time limitation, we go to the ba-
sics and analyze a non-strategic decision. We use a within-
subject design that allows us to investigate individual’s reac-
tions to different levels of time limitation. The experimental
task we use is a binary choice where one of the alternatives
may be better. However, cognitive abilities are required to
be used to correctly evaluate alternatives. We examine the
effects of time limitation on such a primitive decision pro-
cess that includes no strategic interaction. Furthermore, this
study differs from the aforementioned queueing theory lit-
erature in that it analyzes the behavior of a customer who
finds herself in a basic queueing environment and focuses
on the aspects she considers when making a queueing de-
cision. In our setting, the quality of the service is perfectly
known and therefore, the length of a queue does not serve
as a signaling device. (Lu et al., 2013) is strongly related to
our paper. Their empirical study analyzes customers’ pur-
chasing behavior in a queueing environment through a field
experiment conducted at a deli counter of a grocery store.
One of the key findings of this study is that queueing deci-
sions are based mainly on the length of queues rather than
their speed. This particular result chimes nicely with our
experimental finding that some subjects do not appear to in-
corporate server speed information into their decision crite-
rion.
3 Experimental design
In a computerized laboratory setting, we asked subjects to
choose between two queues, each characterized by three at-
tributes: length, speed and entry fee. The length informa-
tion, the number of people waiting in the queue, was given
both numerically and visually using figures. Information
about speed, how fast the queue was moving, was given in
terms of average waiting time (in seconds) per person. Fi-
nally, entry fee was the fee that subjects had to pay (from
their given initial endowment) to join the queue. In all tri-
als, one queue was faster than the other. The faster queue
required an entry fee, whereas the entry to the slower queue
was free in each trial. In what follows, we use the notation
NEF to denote a queue without an entry fee and EF for a
queue with an entry fee. Fig. 3 in Appendix A displays a
snapshot from the experiment.
The experiment included 40 different variants of the
queueing task, each of which was formed by a different
combination of queue attribute values. (Table 7 in Ap-
pendix B shows the variants used.) Each variant was re-
peated three times under different treatment conditions of
time allowance: 5 seconds (5 sec), 10 seconds (10 sec) and
no time limitation (NTL). The experiment was conducted
using a within-subject design and each subject was asked to
make 120 decisions in total. The order of all the 120 trials
was randomized anew for each subject. On each trial, the
time restriction was displayed both by a visual time bar and
a digital count-down timer.
In every trial, subjects were given 100 ECUs (Experimen-
tal Currency Units) as an initial endowment. Two different
types of cost were extracted from this initial endowment:
cost of entry and cost of waiting (0.05 × average waiting
time × number of people in the queue). Each subject paid
the entry fee of the queue she chose to join (zero entry cost
if the slower queue was chosen) and 0.05 ECUs per sec-
ond that she had to wait in the queue before being served.
We should note here that subjects did not really wait but
instead paid a waiting cost. Thus, the score of a trial is
the revenue of the queue chosen to join in that trial, that is
pi = 100− entry fee− cost of waiting, or pi = 0 if the sub-
ject did not submit a decision in the given time. Experi-
mental Currency Units were converted into euros at the rate
of e0.30 and subjects were paid according to their score
in a randomly chosen round. See Appendix A for the in-
structions. Because each trial involved a choice, the optimal
choice was the option with the higher profit, if chosen. Out
of the 40 variants, the faster queue (with the cost) was opti-
mal 15 times, the slower (free) queue was optimal 17 times,
and the two queues were equal 8 times (Appendix B, Table
7).
3.1 Procedures
The experiment was programmed in C++ using a Z-tree in-
terface (Fischbacher, 2007) and conducted in the experi-
mental laboratory of the Max Planck Institute of Economics
in Jena (Germany), directed by Prof. Werner Güth.
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Subjects were undergraduate students from the University
of Jena, recruited via the ORSEE software (Greiner, 2015).
Upon entering the laboratory, subjects were randomly as-
signed to visually isolated computer terminals. The instruc-
tions were distributed and then read aloud to establish public
knowledge.
Overall, we collected 11, 640 observations from 97 sub-
jects across five sessions. On average, each session lasted
about 75 minutes including the time being used up for read-
ing the instructions and paying the subjects. Average earn-
ings per subject were e17 (inclusive of a e2.50 participa-
tion fee).
4 Results
In this section, we present our findings obtained from basic
descriptive analysis, describe the econometric model of the
choice data and present the results.
4.1 Descriptive data analysis
We initially consider the success rate (choice of the queue
with the higher profit, with ties excluded) across treatments.
Of all the decisions made in the treatment without any time
limitation (NTL) only 73% is optimal. This rate decreases to
68%when 10 seconds of time limitation is introduced and as
the limitation becomes more stringent (5 seconds) it drops
to 65%. Hence, looking at the aggregate data immediately
shows that time limitation impairs decision performance.
In order to gain more insight into the subjects’ behavior,
we deepen our analysis by examining the success rate when
it is optimal to join each queue separately. The first row of
Table 1 presents the success rates of the trials for which it is
optimal to join the fee-free queue. In other words, the trials
for which the profit of joining the slower with no entry fee
queue (pi(NEF)) is higher than the profit of joining the faster
with an entry fee queue (pi(EF)). The second row gives the
complementary rates concerning the trials where it is opti-
mal to join the faster queue. The success rate increases as
the time limitation is relaxed even when we consider trials
separately depending on the identity of the optimal queue.
However, a comparison between the rows of Table 1 shows
that in each treatment, the success rate is higher when the
optimal decision is to join the queue with no entry fee. This
observation suggests that there may be a bias to join the
queue without an entry fee.
To attain a finer grain of analysis, we further examine suc-
cess rates by introducing an additional criteria on top of the
identity of optimal queue. The new criteria is the identity of
the shorter queue. Excluding the cases where both queues
have the same length or are equally profitable, we have four
categories of task variants whose success rates are reported
in Table 2, where the length of a queue is denoted by | · |.
Table 1: Success rates across treatments.
5 sec 10 sec NTL
pi(NEF) >pi(EF) 70% 72% 77%
pi(NEF)<pi(EF) 58% 62% 68%
Table 2: Success rates across categories of variants.
|EF|> |NEF| |NEF|> |EF|
pi(NEF)>pi(EF) 79% 61%
pi(NEF)<pi(EF) 53% 70%
The best performed variant category is the one given in
the first cell of Table 2, where the optimal decision is to join
the no entry fee (NEF) queue, which is also shorter. The
second best performed variant type lies in the second cell
on diagonal. This time, the faster queue with entry fee (EF)
is more profitable and shorter. In the off-diagonal cells, the
success rate drops considerably. Thus the better performed
task variants are the ones in which it is optimal to join the
shorter queue. What one might deduce from this observation
is that there may be a bias to join the shorter queue.
The following subsection introduces the mixture model.
A mixture approach is used here to verify whether there are
subjects who efficiently use the information they can extract,
and thus make the optimal queueing decision, in contrast to
subjects who behave inefficiently.
4.2 The mixture model
Let us assume that there are G different types of decision
maker in the population, denoted by the subscript g. Types
differ in the decision rules adopted, that is, in the variables
they consult when choosing their preferred queue. Let i in-
dicate the subject and τ ∈ {5 sec, 10 sec,NTL} denote the
experimental treatment. In each trial, subject i is faced with
the choice between two queues: a slower queue with no en-
try fee (NEF) and a faster queue with entry fee (EF).
If we let dτ∗igt be the latent dependent variable represent-
ing subject i’s propensity to choose queue NEF in treatment
τ and trial t, subject i’s decision could be formulated as fol-
lows:
dτ∗igt = γ
τ
g +X
′
itβ
τ
g + δ
τ
ig + ε
τ
igt t
τ
i = 1, . . . , T
τ
i
δτig ∼ N
(
0, στ2g
)
(1)
ετig ∼ N (0, 1)
Here, γτg is a type-specific intercept; Xit is a vector of ex-
planatory variable describing the characteristics of the two
queues and βτg is a vector of coefficients on such variables;
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δτig is a subject-specific time-invariant intercept, which fol-
lows a Normal distribution with mean 0 and variance στ2g ;
finally, ετig is a Standard Normal distributed idiosyncratic
error term.
We do not observe dτ∗igt directly, but we observe whether
subject i chooses the NEF queue in a specific trial. In other
words, we observe whether her propensity to choose NEF
queue is positive. This relationship can be mathematically
formulated by a {−1, 1} indicator as follows:
dτigt =
{
1 if dτ∗igt ≥ 0,
−1 otherwise.
This is the well-known random-effects probit model, whose
assumptions lead to subject i’s likelihood contribution,
given that she is of type g ∈ 1, . . . , G, being
lτig =
∫
∞
−∞
40∏
t=1
Φ
[
dτigt ×
(
γτg +X
′
itβ
τ
g + δ
τ
ig
)]
× φ
(
δτg ; 0, σ
τ2
g
)
dδτg . (2)
Here, Φ[.] is the Standard Normal Cumulative Distribution
Function and φ
(
δτg ; 0, σ
τ2
g
)
is the Normal Density Function
with mean 0 and variance στ2g , evaluated at δ
τ
g .
Our aim here is to isolate types, i.e., groups of subjects
who adopt similar decision rules when choosing between
NEF and EF queues. For this purpose, we adopt a finite
mixture model approach and assume that there are only two
types (G = 2): (i) “profit maximizer”, who uses all the rele-
vant information and decides rationally, as suggested by the
theory; (ii) “naïve”, who uses the provided information in
a less-than-efficient way. Note at this point that we clas-
sify any behavior that is not rational as naïve and do not
further characterize it by isolating different decision rules
used by non-rational subjects. The reason is that we are
primarily interested in the impact of time limitation on de-
cision performance. Moreover, deepening the investigation
of non-standard behaviors would require a much larger pool
of subjects in order to attain a robust analysis.
We assume that each subject is either profit maximizer or
naïve, and does not change type within a treatment. As data
from each treatment are analyzed separately, the mixture
model hypothesis made here does allow subjects to change
type (decision rules) but only across treatments. Verifying
whether subjects change type and understanding the evolu-
tion of decision rules across treatments are indeed among
the main scopes of our analysis.
The likelihood contribution of subject i in treatment τ is
then
Lτi =
∑
g
pig × l
τ
ig. (3)
Here, pig , termed “mixing proportion”, repre-
sents the fraction of the total sample who are type
g ∈ {prof.max., naïve}, so that
∑
g pig = 1. The mixing
proportions are estimated along with the other parameters
of the model by maximizing the full sample log-likelihood,
Log-Likelihoodτ =
n∑
i=1
ln[Lτi ]. (4)
The mixture model is estimated using the method
of Maximum Simulated Likelihood for each treatment
τ ∈ {5 sec, 10 sec,NTL} separately. In each component g
of the mixture, integration over δτg is performed by simula-
tion using 100 draws for each subject based on Halton se-
quences (Train, 2009).
4.3 Estimation results
The results from the maximization of Equation (4) are re-
ported in Table 3. For each treatment, there are two columns
displaying the parameter estimates of the model for each
type included in the mixture. The behavior of a profit max-
imizer is captured by the difference in profits of the two
queues (∆(profit)=pi(NEF) − pi(EF)), which we use as the
only explanatory variable. On the other hand, the sub-
optimal behavior of a naïve decision maker is modeled by
means of the average waiting times and the lengths of the
two queues, and we also control for the entry fee level of the
EF queue.
The estimated mixing proportion, pig , is statistically sig-
nificantly different from 0 for both types in all treatments.
This indicates that the two types of systematic behavior can
be clearly separated. Furthermore, when the time constraint
becomes more stringent, the fraction of profit maximizers
decreases and thus the decision performance impairs. When
no time limitations are imposed, 65% of subjects are esti-
mated to be profit maximizer. This ratio declines to 50%
under the loose time constraint of 10 seconds. Finally, there
seem to be mildly more naïve subjects than profit maximiz-
ers in treatment 5 sec.
Our results show that the coefficient on the variable of
interest for the profit maximizer, i.e., ∆(profit), is of the
expected sign and statistically significant in each treatment
(∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ denote p-values < 0.01, < 0.05 and < 0.10,
respectively). It amounts to saying that subjects of this
type use the difference in profits as their decision criterion,
and consequently join the queue that provides higher profit
in each treatment. Also the naïve behavior appears to be
consistent across treatments. This type’s decision criterion
seems to include the length of the two queues and the en-
try fee but not the information on average waiting times.
In treatment 5 sec, however, in addition to the previously
named variables, the coefficient on the NEF queue’s average
waiting time is also significant but only slightly so. Further-
more, all the significant variables are of the expected sign.
A possible explanation for naïve subjects’ behavior could be
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Table 3: Maximum simulated likelihood estimates of the mixture model’s parameters.
τ 5 sec 10 sec NTL
g prof.max. naïve prof.max. naïve prof.max. naïve
Regressors
∆(profit) 0.0316∗∗∗ 0.0432∗∗∗ 0.0517∗∗∗
(0.0032) (0.0033) (0.0031)
average waiting time (NEF) −0.0097∗ −0.0082 −0.0014
(0.0052) (0.0054) (0.0069)
average waiting time (EF) −0.0022 0.0077 0.0095
(0.0046) (0.0047) (0.0064)
length (NEF) −0.0368∗∗∗ −0.0278∗∗∗ −0.0259∗∗∗
(0.0051) (0.0051) (0.0062)
length (EF) 0.0360∗∗∗ 0.0344∗∗∗ 0.0481∗∗∗
(0.0034) (0.0036) (0.0048)
entry fee EF server 0.0178∗∗∗ 0.0164∗∗∗ 0.0220∗∗∗
(0.0033) (0.0034) (0.0043)
γg 0.1651
∗∗∗ 0.1418 0.0987∗ −0.2924 0.1384∗∗∗ −1.3057∗∗
(0.0467) (0.4134) (0.0559) (0.4260) (0.0424) (0.5207)
στg 0.1448
∗∗∗ 0.3655∗∗∗ 0.2020∗∗∗ 0.3550∗∗∗ 0.2185∗∗∗ 0.3012∗∗∗
(0.0574) (0.0520) (0.0669) (0.0513) (0.0428) (0.0582)
pig 0.4322
∗∗∗ 0.5678∗∗∗ 0.5036∗∗∗ 0.4964∗∗∗ 0.6478∗∗∗ 0.3522∗∗∗
(0.0802) (0.0802) (0.0764) (0.0764) (0.0667) (0.0667)
Log-Likelihood –2371.93 –2335.28 –2182.46
number of observations 3860 3873 3880
number of subjects 97 97 97
that they filter the available information, concentrating only
on a subset that they perceive as important. According to
this explanation, the information on average waiting times
is apparently seen to be relatively less important. An alter-
native explanation can be that some naïve subjects opt for a
simpler strategy (for example, that of following the shorter
queue or joining the no entry fee queue, or even a mixture of
the two), rather than analyzing the situation normatively. We
cannot clearly determine which explanation is more plausi-
ble since, as mentioned earlier, we classify any non-rational
behavior as naïve.
Note that a mixture model assigns subjects to types prob-
abilistically. Therefore, it does not specify which subject
is assigned to which type directly. Furthermore, the model
is run separately for each treatment. This implies that the
model does not help us determine whether a subject as-
signed to a specific type in one treatment is also assigned to
the same type in the other treatments. The next subsection
investigates this issue and examines how behaviors evolve
across treatments.
4.4 The evolution of decision rules
We start investigating the evolution of decision rules by cal-
culating for each subject the posterior probability of being
a specific type in each treatment τ ∈ {5 sec, 10 sec,NTL}.
We derive these probabilities using Bayes’ rule and
the estimation results from our mixture model (see Ta-
ble 3). Subject i’s posterior probability of being type
g ∈ {prof. max., naïve} in treatment τ is given by
ppτi,g(obs
τ
i ) = Pr [i = type g | obs
τ
i ]
=
Pr [i = type g]× Pr [obsτi | i = type g]
Pr [obsτi ]
(5)
=
piτg × l
τ
ig
Lτi
,
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Figure 1: Histograms of posterior probabilities of being profit maximizer type.
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .8 .9 1 0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .8 .9 1 0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .8 .9 1
5sec 10sec NTL
posterior probability of being type "profit maximiser"
Table 4: Behavioral profile proportions
τ
5 sec 10 sec NTL Proportion
naïve naïve naïve 11%
naïve naïve prof.max. 30%
naïve prof.max. naïve 1%
naïve prof.max. prof.max. 18%
prof.max. naïve naïve 3%
prof.max. naïve prof.max. 7%
prof.max. prof.max. naïve 1%
prof.max. prof.max. prof.max. 29%
where obsτi represents the observations collected from sub-
ject i in treatment τ . In practice, piτg , l
τ
ig and L
τ
i are re-
placed by their estimated counterparts, obtained by maxi-
mizing Equation (4) from treatment τ data. Obviously, sub-
ject i’s posterior probability of being naïve type is obtained
by ppτi,naïve = 1− pp
τ
i,prof.max., for all τ .
The histograms of the posterior probabilities of being
profit maximizer type are displayed in Figure 1. The re-
sulting posterior probabilities are consistent with the mix-
ing proportions estimated by the mixture model. In treat-
ment 5 sec, the naïve type is mildly preponderant. When the
time allowance is 10 seconds, the posterior probabilities of
being one of the two types are almost equal. With no time
limitations, the naïve type is decidedly recessive. Most of
the subjects are concentrated at the extremes of the distri-
butions. This finding testifies that our mixtures are rather
powerful at segregating subjects, except for a small num-
ber of them for whom there is some uncertainty. We assign
subjects to types according to the maximum posterior prob-
ability. Figure 2 shows the cumulative percentage of sub-
jects assigned to a type with maximum posterior probability
less than the probability indicated on the horizontal axis, for
each treatment. The figure confirms that the power of our
mixture model at segregating subjects is quite impressive:
60%, 70% and 85% of them are assigned to a type with pos-
terior probability larger than 0.90 in treatment 5 sec, 10 sec
and NTL, respectively. Overall, the assignment to a type is
remarkably good in the treatment with no time limitation,
only marginally less in the other two cases.1
Having assigned each subject to a type in each treatment,
now we are ready to consider subjects’ profiles throughout
the experiment. We have overall eight possible profiles since
there are three treatments and two types in each treatment.
Table 4 reports proportions for these eight profiles. Previ-
ous works (Stiensmeier-Pelster & Schürmann, 1993; Ver-
planken, 1993) suggest that individuals exhibit differences
in how they react to time limitation. Table 4 not only sup-
ports this idea but also provides further evidence of hetero-
geneity in the way that subjects change their reactions due
to different levels of time limitation.
1We checked for the presence of order and learning effects both across
all trials and within each treatment. We did not find any evidence of such
effects. Wemight argue that this is possibly due to the implemented random
presentation order of the experimental tasks.
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Figure 2: Cumulative proportion of subjects assigned to a type with maximum posterior probability < posterior probability
indicated on the horizontal axis, by treatment.
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The most popular profile (accounting for 30% of our sam-
ple) is the one where subjects are assigned to the naïve type
in treatments 5 sec and 10 sec, but to the profit maximizer
type in treatment NTL (second row of Table 4). When there
are time limitations, 30% of our sample fails to make the
optimal decision but manages to do so when no limitation
is imposed. A possible explanation for this behavior could
be that the given time allowances are not long enough to
think thoroughly and evaluate which queue is more prof-
itable. However, when time limitations are removed, sub-
jects can take the necessary time and make the optimal de-
cision. Another possibility is that it is not the tightness of
the time allowances (especially for treatment 10 sec) that
causes these subjects to perform badly in treatments 5 sec
and 10 sec but the presence of a limitation tout court. Under
time limitation, they might panic and use their time ineffi-
ciently, therefore fail to follow the optimal decision strategy.
We postpone the investigation of this issue to the next sub-
section, where we consider decision times.
Table 4 reveals that the second most popular profile, rep-
resenting 29% of our subject pool, is being profit maximizer
type in each treatment. These subjects behave consistently
throughout the experiment, and the different time limitations
do not seem to affect their making rational decisions. The
other profile that is consistent throughout the experiment is
the one in which subjects are assigned to the naïve type in
each treatment. It represents 11% of our sample. In total
40% of the subjects behave consistently and do not change
type across treatments. This amounts to saying that time
limitation does not have any sort of effect on the perfor-
mance of these subjects.
One possible explanation that might account for the
results presented in Table 4 holds that people are di-
versely able/willing to pursue optimal information process-
ing. Eleven percent of the sample never implements the op-
timal strategy, while 30% is able to do so only when there
is no time limitation. Moreover, 29% of our subjects is able
to pursue the optimal strategy under any treatment condition
and 18% are able to do so except in treatment 5 sec.
This explanation accounts not only for our 4 most popu-
lar types, which make up 88% of all subjects, but can also
be viewed as an implication of the results by Stiensmeier-
Pelster and Schürmann (1993). They show that, when cop-
ing with time pressure, some subjects accelerate their in-
formation processing while others adapt by filtering the in-
formation. Those who manage to accelerate under a certain
time limitation, say 10 sec, may implement the optimal strat-
egy since they are able to optimally process information at a
faster pace. However, those who cannot accelerate may filter
the information, and focus only on a subset of it that is per-
ceived as the most important. This focus, in turn, may make
them fail to pursue the optimal strategy not only in treatment
10 sec but also in the 5 sec one. Furthermore, this explana-
tion chimes nicely with the hierarchical responses argument
of Payne et al. (1988). People first engage in acceleration
and try to respond by working faster. If the pressure is too
high and acceleration does not suffice, they may next filter
the available information and consider only a subset of it.
The results presented in Table 4 could be interpreted as fol-
lows: our subjects are diverse in their ability or willingness
to switch from acceleration to filtration. Some filter always,
some others switch from acceleration to filtration whenever
there is a time limitation (treatments 10 sec and 5 sec) and
some switch only when the limitation is too stringent (treat-
ment 5 sec). Finally, there are also those who can cope with
time limitation without changing strategy.
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Table 5: Summary statistics of decision times.
τ 5 sec 10 sec NTL
Mean 2.394 3.314 8.295
Std. Dev. 0.764 1.407 5.181
Min 0.605 0.670 1.210
Max 3.842 6.275 23.274
Number of subjects 97 97 97
In the next subsection, we analyze decision times to ver-
ify whether profit maximizers adapt to time limitation by
acceleration. Moreover we investigate whether the impair-
ment of decision performance is due to the tightness of time
allowances or due to (the stress caused by) the presence of a
time limitation.
4.5 Decision times
In treatment 5 sec, 13 out of 97 subjects failed to complete
the task only in one trial, 2 subjects did so in two trials and
only one subject in three trials; whereas, in treatment 10 sec,
7 subjects failed to do so only once. Thus, we have a total
of 27 missing observations out of 11640 (97 subjects × 120
trials) data points (that is, only 0.2% of data are missing).
In these few cases, for the tables and the tests reported in
this subsection, we have replaced the missing decision times
with the upper time limit. Even if we neglect these missing
observations, the reported tests’ results do not alter.
Table 5 presents descriptive statistics of decision times
across three treatments and reveals that subjects use more
time as time limitations are relaxed, on average. Paired t-
tests confirm that these differences are statistically signifi-
cant.2 We already know that subjects perform best in the no
time limitation treatment (see Table 3), and Table 5 reveals
that the average decision time in this treatment is around 8.3
seconds. Under a mild time limitation (10 sec), however,
subjects use only one-third of the given time allowance, on
average. This indicates that the presence of a time limita-
tion puts a great deal of subjects under pressure and hinders
them from using the given time efficiently. Likewise, under
the stringent time limitation of 5 seconds, subjects use only
half of the given time, on average.
We deepen our analysis by examining how decision times
of profit maximizer and naïve subjects change across treat-
ments. The descriptive statistics given in Table 6 show that
our previous observation that subjects take more time to de-
2The paired t-test statistics take values −11.912, −12.279 and
−11.306, for comparisons 5 sec vs. 10 sec, 5 sec vs. NTL and 10 sec
vs. NTL, respectively. The associated p-values are all < 0.001. As a
robustness check, all the tests in this section have been repeated after tak-
ing the logarithmic transformation of the decision times and removing a
few outliers. The results, available upon request, remain unaltered.
cide when the limitations are relaxed holds regardless of
types. Furthermore, profit maximizers spend more time than
naïve subjects no matter what the time limitation is. In fact,
a two-sample t-test with unequal variances, whose statistics
and p-values are reported in the table, confirms that regard-
less of the treatment we can reject the hypothesis that both
types spend the same amount of time, on average, to arrive
at a decision. Thus, a naïve subject uses a decision strategy
that is faster relative to the one used by a profit maximizer.3
In the previous subsection we have seen that there are
mainly 4 common profiles in our population (see Table 4).
Thirty per cent of subjects can implement the optimal strat-
egy when there is no time limitation, spending 9 seconds,
on average. However, when under the mild time limitation
of 10 seconds — which is more than what they spend un-
der no limitation — they use only a quarter of the given
time (or one-third of what they use under treatment NTL)
and fail to implement the optimal strategy. Thus under a
mild time limitations, 30% of subjects seem to switch to a
strategy that requires less time but impairs decision perfor-
mance. Such an alternative strategy may be pursued, for ex-
ample, by filtration, following the shorter queue or joining
the queue with no entry fee. Another 18% of subjects show a
similar pattern, but they switch to an alternative only under
the stringent time limitation of 5 seconds. These subjects
spend on average 4 seconds (1.5 times more than the previ-
ously mentioned group) and implement the optimal strategy
in treatment 10 sec. One could interpret this result by using
the hierarchical response argument of Payne et al. (1988):
these subjects adapt to time limitation first by accelerating
but when the pressure is too high and acceleration does not
suffice, they use filtration or another simpler strategy.
An interesting observation concerning the subjects who
switch strategy under time limitation is that they show this
behavior even though the given time allowance is more
than what they spend before switching. As noted ear-
lier, profit maximizers arrive at a decision in about 9 sec-
onds under treatment NTL. Although in treatment 10 sec
they still have enough time to pursue their strategy, al-
most 44% (= (30 + 7)/(30 + 7 + 18 + 29), see Table 4) of
them switch and fail to pursue the optimal strategy. Like-
wise, profit maximizers of 10 sec treatment make their de-
cisions in about 4 seconds. In treatment 5 sec, almost
39% (= (1 + 18)/(1 + 18 + 1 + 29), see Table 4) of them
alter their strategy of treatment 10 sec even though they still
have enough time to follow it. Hence what impairs subjects’
decision performance is apparently not the tightness of time
constraint but rather the existence of such a constraint.
The other two common profiles do not involve any
switches. The one that assigns subjects to the profit maxi-
3The results of the tests reported in Table 6, as well as those discussed
in footnote 2, remain unaltered if recomputed from the subsample of (37)
subjects who are assigned to type with a posterior probability larger than
0.90 in all treatments.
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Table 6: Summary statistics of decision times by types
τ 5 sec 10 sec NTL
g prof.max. naïve prof.max. naïve prof.max. naïve
Mean 2.724 2.172 3.986 2.682 9.024 4.609
Std. Dev. 0.659 0.754 1.375 1.122 5.287 2.318
t-statistic –3.713 –5.128 –3.268
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.001
Number of subjects 39 58 47 50 81 16
mizer type in each treatment is adopted by 29% of the popu-
lation. These subjects spend less time under time limitation
but still manage to pursue the optimal strategy. Thus they
seem to adapt to time limitation by acceleration. Finally,
11% of subjects are assigned to the naïve type in each treat-
ment. They are not willing or able to implement the optimal
strategy even in the absence of time limitation, and the pres-
ence of such limitations does not impair their performance.
5 Discussion
The main contribution of this study is twofold. Firstly, it
adds to the understanding of the impact of time limitation
on non-strategic decisions. Secondly, it contributes to the
characterization of customers’ queueing behavior by exper-
imentally examining the situation in which subjects need to
choose between two queues under different treatment condi-
tions of time allowance. Our econometric analysis suggests
that, with no time limitation, a considerable proportion of
the population behaves consistently with the principles of
rationality, which require comparing the profits of joining
each queue. Time limitation increasingly harms decision
performance and decreases that proportion. The rest of the
population does not use the provided information in a nor-
mative way. They do not appear to incorporate the informa-
tion on server speed, which is given as the average waiting
time per person in the queue, into their decisions.
At a finer grain of analysis, we find that our subjects are
affected differently by time limitation. Among the subjects
who implement the optimal strategy when there is no time
limitation, some fail to pursue it under both a mild and a
stringent time limitation of 10 and 5 seconds, respectively,
while some others manage to do so when time allowance is
10 seconds but not when it is 5 seconds. Finally, some sub-
jects do not seem to be affected by time limitation. Almost
two-thirds of the subjects in this group behave consistently
with the principles of rationality and adapt to time limitation
by increasing their pace. A likely interpretation of this result
is that subjects show a hierarchy of responses to time limita-
tion (Payne et al., 1988), but they do this in diverse manners.
When facing time limitation they seem to respond by work-
ing faster. If acceleration does not suffice, they switch to
another simple strategy (e.g., filtering, following the shorter
queue, and so on). But the switch point is not the same for
everyone: some switch under any level of time limitation;
some, instead, adapt acceleration under mild time limitation
but switch when it is stringent; some others do not switch at
all. A possible avenue for future research is to use process-
tracking techniques, like eye-tracking, in order to test our
conclusions about such processes.
The analysis of decision times reveals that the reason why
time limitation harms decision performance of most subjects
is not the insufficiency of time but the existence of a limi-
tation. Time constraint seems to stress many people, urging
them to use simple strategies or heuristics, instead of ana-
lyzing the situation normatively. That is to say, no trifling
portion of subjects systematically follows the shorter queue,
for example, when there is time limitation, but acts almost
rationally when the constraint vanishes.
Although the queueing environment studied in this work
is very simplistic, our findings potentially pave the way for
further research by providing useful inputs. One suggestion
that stems from them is to deepen the investigation of non-
standard behavior. In this study, we classify any behavior
that is not rational as naïve. However, using a sufficiently
large number of subjects, the non-rational behavior could be
further categorized into different decision rules. The char-
acterization of different types could lead to a mechanism de-
sign that screens and discriminates customers based on their
types, and to an examination of the welfare effect of such a
process.
There are some limitations to this experiment. We pro-
vided subjects with explicit information on the server speed
in order to see how they react to it. In a real-world situ-
ation, this piece of information is not explicitly available
but could be extracted by observing the queue for a while.
However the evidence that some subjects do not seem to in-
corporate this information into their decisions suggests that
they would not even try to extract it when facing a similar
situation in everyday life.
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A more serious limitation is that the subjects did not ex-
perience the irritation and annoyance of waiting in a queue.
A trial finished and a new one began immediately after a
subject made her decision to which queue to join, without
waiting for real. Designing an experiment that involves real
waiting is problematic because the cost of waiting is subjec-
tive and not observable. That is, each subject’s annoyance
due to waiting may be different, and moreover, measuring
or deducing it may not even be possible. Finally, due to the
accumulation effect of this cost, a robust analysis would re-
quire a huge sample, since no more than a few observations
could be obtained from a single subject.
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Appendix A: Instructions (in their En-
glish translation)
Instructions
Welcome and thank you for your participation in this exper-
iment. Its results will be used for the purpose of academic
research and will be published in a way that preserves your
anonymity.
The funds for this research have been provided by the
Max Planck Institute of Economics. The experiment is
straightforward, and you can earn an amount of money
which will be paid to you in cash immediately at the end.
There is no right or wrong answer, but your decisions will
affect your payment. The decisions of the other subjects,
however, do not have any influence on your payment.
You receive e2.5 as participation fee for showing up on
time. In addition, you will earn an extra amount of money,
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depending on the decisions that you make during the exper-
iment. The experiment consists of 120 trials. One of these
trials will be randomly selected at the end of the experiment
to determine your total payment. Payments will be carried
out privately so that the other subjects will not observe how
much you earn.
In the experiment, the amounts are shown in ECUs (Ex-
perimental Currency Unit) rather than Euros. At the end of
the experiment, earnings in ECUs will be exchanged into
Euros using the following exchange rate:
1 ECU = 0.30 Euro
This means that, for each ECU you earn, you will receive
e0.30. During the experiment, it is strictly forbidden to talk
to the other subjects. Failure to comply with this rule will
lead to an immediate termination of the experiment and no
payments will be made. Please turn off your mobile phones
now. In case you have questions, just raise your hand and
one of the experimenters will come to your aid.
The experiment
The experiment lasts 120 trials. At the beginning of each
trial, you receive an endowment of 100 ECUs. In each trial,
you will be confronted with two servers (server A and server
B), and one queue in front of each server (queue A and
queue B). The queues consist of people waiting for their turn
to get a service. Both of the servers provide the same ser-
vice. However, server B is faster than server A. Therefore,
it is costly to get the service from server B, whereas it is
free for server A. Furthermore, waiting is also costly: each
100 seconds spent in a queue will cost you 5 ECUs (i.e.,
0.05 ECU per second) that will be withdrawn from your en-
dowment. This means that, if you decide to be served by
server A, your payoff will be the initial endowment, 100
ECUs, minus your total waiting cost; instead, if you decide
to be served by server B, your final payoff will be the initial
endowment, 100 ECUs, minus the entry cost minus your
waiting cost. The waiting cost of a server is given by the
total waiting time multiplied by 0.05 (the cost per second).
The total waiting time is computed as the number of people
queuing times the average waiting time per person at that
server.
In each trial, you are provided the following information
on the screeen:
• A graphical representation of the queues;
• The entry fee for server B;
• The number of people in each queue;
• The average waiting time per person for each server.
In each trial, you are requested to decide to which server
queue you would like to be joined. To make each decision,
one of the following time limitations applies: (i) 5 seconds;
(ii) 10 seconds; (iii) no time limitation. At the top of the
screen, you will see a digital timer and a time bar that indi-
cate how much time you have left to make a decision.
Please note: If you do not make your decision within
the specified time limit, your score for that trial is 0. This
implies that, in case a trial in which you did not submit a
choice of server in time is selected for payment at the end of
the experiment, you will only receive e2.5 for your partici-
pation.
Below (in Fig. 3, here) you can find a screenshot of the
experiment. In the figure, you can notice what follows:
Figure 3: A snapshot from the experiment
• The entry fee of server B is 10 ECUs;
• There are 10 people waiting in server A’s queue and 50
people in server B’s queue;
• The average waiting time per person is 45 seconds in
server A and 23 seconds in server B.
You are asked to indicate your decision on which server
queue to join by pressing the relevant key on the keyboard,
that is, key “A” for server queue A and key “B” for server
queue B.
After you have made your decision, a pop-up window
where you can see the decision just made in that trial will
appear. You need to press the “Enter” key on the keyboard
to close this window and proceed to the next trial. That is, a
trial finishes as soon as you make your decision, and the next
trial starts when you press the “Enter” key. This amounts to
saying that waiting in a queue is hypothetical, you will not
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actually wait but a waiting cost will be subtracted from your
endowment. A detailed explanation of the payment method
follows below.
If during the experiment an error in the program occurs,
do not enter any input or try to solve the problem by your-
self. Simply, raise your hand and one of the experimenters
will come to your aid.
Payment method
Your final payoff will be calculated as follows. At the end
of the experiment, one of the 120 trials will be selected ran-
domly. This will be done by drawing a ball from an urn
containing 120 numbered balls. You will receive your score
of this randomly selected trial (based on the characteristics
of server you chose to join in that trial) plus the participation
fee (e2.5).
Your score in a trial is what remains after subtracting from
the initial endowment of 100 ECUs entry fee and waiting
cost of the chosen server. As already specified, you will
be charged 5 ECUs for each 100 seconds (hypothetically)
spent in that queue, therefore your waiting cost will be the
total waiting time (in seconds) multiplied by 0.05. Finally,
the exchange rate 0.30 will be used to convert ECUs into
Euros. That is,
Payoff = Score of the randomly selected trial
+ Participation fee
= endowment− entry-fee− waiting cost)∗
exchange rate+ Participation fee
= (100− entry fee− total waiting time ∗ 0.05)∗
e0.30+ e2.5
If you have any doubts or queries please call over an ex-
perimenter.
Thank you very much for your participation.
Appendix B: Variants list
Table 7 presents the 40 variants of the queueing task we
used in the experiment. Its columns report the following in-
formation: “Speed” is the average waiting time in seconds;
“Length” is the number of people waiting in the queue; “En-
try Fee” is the entry fee in ECUs; pi(.) is the profit of the
queue in ECUs (not provided to subjects).
Table 7: Variants of the experimental task.
Queue A Queue B
Speed Length pi(NEF) Speed Length
Entry
fee
pi(EF)
20 50 50 10 20 20 70
20 50 50 10 20 30 60
20 50 50 10 20 40 50
20 50 50 10 20 50 40
20 50 50 10 20 60 30
20 50 50 10 20 65 25
30 40 40 20 20 10 70
30 40 40 20 30 10 60
30 40 40 20 40 10 50
30 40 40 20 50 10 40
30 40 40 20 60 10 30
30 40 40 20 65 10 25
40 25 50 10 40 10 70
40 25 50 15 40 10 60
40 25 50 20 40 10 50
40 25 50 25 40 10 40
40 25 50 30 40 10 30
40 25 50 33 40 10 24
30 50 25 20 50 10 40
30 46 31 20 50 10 40
30 40 40 20 50 10 40
30 34 49 20 50 10 40
30 27 59.5 20 50 10 40
30 20 70 20 50 10 40
60 25 25 10 40 40 40
55 25 31.25 10 40 40 40
48 25 40 10 40 40 40
40 25 50 10 40 40 40
30 25 62.5 10 40 40 40
24 25 70 10 40 40 40
50 30 25 10 5 60 37.5
50 25 37.5 10 5 60 37.5
50 25 37.5 10 10 60 35
50 30 25 10 10 60 35
50 28 30 35 0 50 50
50 24 40 35 0 50 50
50 20 50 35 0 50 50
50 16 60 35 0 50 50
50 12 70 35 0 50 50
50 16 60 10 20 30 60
